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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
EDWARD H. JAMES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920264-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted burglary, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 
and 76-6-202 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), as the 
appeal is from a district court in a criminal case not involving 
a conviction of a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly adopt the findings 
and conclusions submitted by the prosecution? 
"The discretion of adopting the findings as submitted 
to the trial court is exclusively in th[e district] court as long 
as the findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence." Bover 
Co. v. Licmell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). 
2. Was the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress correct under the federal constitution? 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
. . • However, in assessing the trial 
court's legal conclusions based upon its 
factual findings, we afford it no deference 
but apply a "correction of error" standard. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 1989) (citations 
omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). 
3. Has defendant waived the issue of a separate state 
constitutional analysis by failure to adequately preserve it; 
alternatively, should the Court conduct such analysis in this 
case? 
M[T]he proper forum in which to commence 
thoughtful and probing analysis of state 
constitutional interpretation is before the 
trial court, not, as typically happens and as 
happened here, for the first time on appeal. 
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 28, 1991, defendant was arrested and, on April 
1, 1991, charged with burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202; and theft, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Record 
[hereafter R.] at 10, 7-8). 
After the case was bound over, defendant filed a motion 
on April 30, 1991, to suppress any statements he had made to law 
enforcement, claiming they were taken in violation of "his 
Miranda [sic] rights and his fifth and sixth amendment rights" 
-2-
(R. at 21). A hearing was held on the motion on May 8, 1991 at 
which only the two detectives who took defendant's statements 
testified (R. at 23, 140-641). The court took the matter under 
advisement, indicating that his initial inclination was to 
suppress the confession but he would reserve his ruling until he 
had read the cases provided by the parties (R. at 23, 161). The 
State filed a memorandum regarding the admissibility issue on May 
9, 1991 (R. at 24-33). 
On May 13, 1991, the court entered its ruling, denying 
the motion to suppress (R. at 78, 184-87). On that same day, the 
State submitted proposed findings and conclusion, to which 
defendant filed objections on May 21, 1991. On May 24, 1991, the 
court signed the findings and conclusions as drafted by the 
prosecution (R. at 81-87). 
On June 20, 1991, defendant filed a second motion to 
suppress his statements, claiming that they were taken "in 
violation of his rights to silence and to counsel under the Utah 
State Constitution" (R. at 89). He filed a supporting memorandum 
on July 3, 1991 (R. at 92-101). A hearing was conducted on that 
motion on July 8, 1991 and the court took the matter under 
advisement (R. at 91, 165-70). 
The court denied the motion on July 15, 1991, stating 
that fl[t]he court believed that confession made by the defendant 
2The two transcript volumes are numbered consecutively to the 
pleadings volume. Citation will be to the record pages stamped on 
the bottom of each page* 
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was done in a non accusatory [sic] environment" (R. at 108).2 
On November 12, 1991, defendant entered a guilty plea to a 
reduced charge of attempted burglary, conditioned on taking this 
appeal of the court's denial of his suppression motions (R. at 
114-21, 171-80). On February 10, 1992, defendant was sentenced 
and placed on probation (R. at 123-24). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of the underlying crime are sketchy in the 
record and will not be recited here; the facts pertinent to this 
appeal surround the incriminating statements given by defendant 
to detectives. 
Defendant was arrested March 28, 1991, at his apartment 
at 355 North 700 West #2, Salt Lake City, Utah, on suspicion of 
burglary and theft (R. at 10). The next day, at 10:14 a.m., two 
detectives, who had not been involved in his arrest or booking, 
went to the jail to interview him (R. at 141-42, 146, 151). At 
the request of the detectives, Newren and Cheever, defendant was 
called out of his cell and taken to an interview room where the 
detectives waited (R. at 142). The detectives told defendant 
that they were doing a "follow-up investigation" of the burglary 
and theft which had occurred at 355 North 700 West #3 (a 
neighboring apartment) (R. at 143, 152). Before advising him of 
any rights under Miranda,3 the detectives first asked him 
2Pages 108-113 are out of order at the back of the pleadings 
file. 
3Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 
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identifying questions, such as his name, date of birth, birth 
place, living arrangements, and employment (R. at 144). 
Defendant was cooperative and answered those questions (R. 144-
45). One of the detectives, probably Cheever, asked "something 
about what [defendant] did for a living" and defendant said he 
was not working at that time (R. 145, 155). There was a slight 
pause, then defendant "said at that point that he got the idea in 
his head and that he did it, he went into a neighbor's house and 
took a coat and stereo, and they [sic] found it" (R. at 155-56). 
The statement was not in response to any question about the 
burglary; instead, it came "out of the blue" (R. at 155). The 
detectives then interrupted defendant and advised him of the 
Miranda warnings (R. at 147, 156). After defendant waived his 
rights under Miranda/ the detectives began to question him about 
the burglary and theft (R. at 147, 156-57). Defendant gave 
further incriminating statements which were not recited at the 
hearings (R. at 147, 157). 
The detectives testified that they did not use any 
physical force, deception, artifice or measure of intimidation to 
compel defendant to talk (R. at 149-50, 157-58). Defendant spoke 
English and appeared to have all of his faculties; there were no 
signs of impairment such as alcohol or drug use (R. at 158). 
Defendant offered no evidence contradicting the testimony of the 
detectives. 
After the evidence was concluded, the court discussed 
the case with counsel, specifically asking the prosecution why 
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the detectives did not save all this bother and advise of Miranda 
before asking any questions (R. at 160). The court expressed its 
inclination to suppress the confession because "[i]t would have 
only taken them about a second to read [the warnings] when they 
brought him down to investigate; ask about the crime" (R. at 
161). The prosecution presented its argument, relying on Oregon 
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), and the court 
reserved its ruling until it had had a chance to review the cases 
cited by defendant and the prosecution (R. at 159-64). 
On May 13, 1991, the court found the prosecution's 
cases to be persuasive and denied the suppression motion. The 
court's personal feelings had not changed since the previous 
hearings, he felt that the confession should be suppressed; 
however, he felt that the law compelled him to deny the motion 
(R. at 184-85). The prosecutor, as offered, prepared findings of 
fact and conclusions of law (R. at 184, 84-87). Defendant filed 
objections thereto; however, the court signed them as prepared by 
the prosecution (R. at 81-83, 87). 
Over a month later, defendant filed a second motion to 
suppress his statements, this time based on the state 
constitution (R. at 92-101). In this motion, defendant stated 
that the court should afford greater protections under the state 
constitution than those afforded under the federal constitution. 
However, defendant did not present any specific way in which that 
should be accomplished; he merely asked the court to suppress his 
statements under the state constitution (R. at 97-101). 
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Defendant did cite to Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 
(Utah 1983), for the proposition that Miranda warnings should be 
given when "the environment" becomes accusatory (R. at 86); 
however, defendant did not link this to the state constitution. 
The court denied the second motion, determining that defendant's 
statement had been made in a "non accusatory [sic] environment" 
(R. at 108). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's adoption of the findings and 
conclusions submitted by the prosecution was not "merely 
mechanical." The court had given the decision much thought and 
had the benefit of defendant's filed objections to the findings 
and conclusions. The record demonstrates that the court 
adequately deliberated and considered the merits of the case 
before adopting the proposed findings and conclusions. Neither 
were the findings contrary to any "oral finding" because the 
court entered few, if any, findings orally. Finally, the record 
supports the findings so they were not in conflict with the 
evidence. 
The court correctly denied the suppression motion under 
the federal constitution because the biographical data questions 
asked of defendant were not "interrogation" in the Miranda sense. 
Defendant's volunteered statement that he had committed the 
burglary and theft did not come in response to a question which 
the officers reasonably should have known would have elicited an 
incriminating response. Even if the volunteered statement should 
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have been suppressed, the statements obtained after Miranda 
warnings were given were admissible under federal law. Finally, 
defendant's claim that the officers did not record the statements 
is not factually correct; they were recorded in the officers' 
reports. 
Defendant has waived the issue of a separate state 
constitutional analysis of his claims because he failed to 
preserve them. The motion below failed to provide "thoughtful 
and probing analysis" of the state claim. Alternatively, the 
different Miranda-type requirements sought to be established by 
defendant would only cause confusion and unworkable direction to 
police officers. Since there is no current contradictory and 
confusing law under the federal standard, there is no need to 
adopt a separate state standard. A separate requirement for 
audio or videotaping of the statements before they are admissible 
is a change which "should be made only after a full hearing of 
all the policy and financial implications and with adequate 
advance notice to . . . law enforcement." Finally, federal law 
regarding admission of statements obtained after warning which 
followed previous unwarned but uncoerced statements is consistent 
with current state law and no reason was given for rejecting the 
federal case law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADOPTED THE 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS SUBMITTED BY THE 
PROSECUTION; ADDITIONALLY, THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS DID NOT CONFLICT WITH THE 
EVIDENCE OR ANY RULING BY THE COURT 
Defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly 
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by 
the prosecution. Defendant also maintains that the court entered 
an oral ruling at the conclusion of the suppression hearing and 
that the findings of fact and conclusions of law later signed by 
the judge conflicted with that ruling and with the evidence. 
Whether to adopt findings as submitted to the court is 
within the discretion of the court "as long as the findings are 
not clearly contrary to the evidence." Bover Co. v. Liqnell, 567 
P.2d 1112, 1114 (Utah 1977). A court's findings of fact are 
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous; however, "in assessing 
the trial court's legal conclusions based upon its factual 
findings, we afford it no deference but apply a 'correction of 
error' standard." State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). 
In Bover Co. v. Liqnell, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The law is well settled that it is the duty 
of the trial judge in contested cases to find 
facts upon all material issues submitted for 
decision unless findings are waived. The 
court may ask counsel to submit findings to 
aid the court in making the necessary 
findings for the particular case. While we 
do not recommend that the trial judge 
"mechanically adopt" the findings as prepared 
by the prevailing party, we certainly do not 
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find such to be the fact in this case* After 
the proposed "findings" were submitted by 
defendants' counsel, the plaintiff filed 
objections and proposed amendments which were 
argued before the trial court who ultimately 
adopted the findings as submitted. The 
discretion of adopting the findings as 
submitted to the trial court is exclusively 
in that court as long as the findings are not 
clearly contrary to the evidence. 
Id. at 1113-14 (footnotes omitted). In Automatic Control 
Products v. Tel-Tech, 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989), the supreme 
court rejected a claim that the trial court had erred in 
mechanically adopting the findings and conclusions submitted by 
counsel. The court found that M[t]here is no indication from the 
record here that the trial judge failed to adequately deliberate 
and consider the merits of the case." J[d. at 1260. 
After the trial, the court took the case 
under advisement, allowing both parties to 
submit memoranda, and later requested both 
parties to submit proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. 
Id. Defendant cites to a concurring opinion, in which Justice 
Zimmerman states that he personally "'feel[s] freer in close 
cases to disregard a finding or remand for further findings if 
the trial court did not prepare them him [or her] self.'" Jd. at 
1264 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (quoting 9 Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2578, at 707 (1971)). Contrary 
to defendant's implication at page 11 of his brief, the supreme 
court did not cite that portion of the concurrence with approval 
in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990). 
Justice Zimmerman wrote for the unanimous court in Rio Vista. 
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The text of the opinion immediately preceding the citation to 
Automatic Control reads in pertinent part: 
[T]here is an apparent inconsistency between 
the reasoning of the findings and conclusions 
and the district court's memorandum decision. 
The findings and conclusions state [that a 
specific defense was not available to 
defendant]. Yet in the cursory memorandum 
decision, the judge stated that he was not 
reaching this issue. The explanation for 
this inconsistency may be that the judge 
changed his mind. It may also be that 
counsel . . ., in drafting the findings and 
conclusions, thought that the issue . . . 
should be addressed to strengthen the 
ultimate conclusion that the statute violated 
the constitution . . . . Whatever reason for 
this inconsistency, the findings and 
conclusions were signed by the judge and are 
not attacked here as not representing his 
views. We must assume that he found them 
satisfactory in all particulars. See 
Automatic Control Prods. Corp. . . . 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Rio Vista, 786 P.2d at 1347. 
The cases cited by defendant do not support his 
contention that this Court should pay less deference to the 
findings and conclusions because they were drafted by counsel. 
In the present case, defendant filed objections and proposed 
amendments to the findings and conclusions submitted by the 
prosecution. (The proposed findings and conclusions are found at 
R. at 84-87, a copy is attached as Addendum A; the objections are 
at R. at 81-83, a copy is attached as Addendum B). There is no 
indication in the record that the trial judge "failed to 
adequately deliberate and consider the merits of the case." 
Automatic Control Prods. Corp., 780 P.2d at 1260. After hearing 
the evidence surrounding defendant's statements, the court heard 
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argument, expressed a preliminary opinion about admissibility, 
then took the matter under advisement in order to read the cases 
upon which the parties were relying (R. at 160-64). The next 
day, the prosecution filed a memorandum presenting the State's 
cases and argument (R. at 24-33, a copy is attached as Addendum 
C). Five days after the hearing, the court found that the cases 
presented by the State were persuasive and, "even though [the 
court's] feelings were to the contrary," he felt that the law 
supported admission of the statements (R. at 184). The court 
indicated that he had given the issue considerable thought and, 
despite how he felt personally, had come to the conclusion that 
the suppression motion had to be denied (R. at 185). The 
proposed findings and conclusions were submitted on May 13, 
defendant's objections were filed on May 21, and the court signed 
the findings and conclusions on May 24 (R. at 88, 83, 87). The 
record supports the conclusion that the trial court did not 
"mechanically adopt" the findings and conclusions. The court had 
the benefit of defendant's objections and the record indicates 
that the court "adequately deliberate[d] and consider[ed] the 
merits of the case." J[d. Given the court's personal misgivings 
about what the law should be and defendant's filed objections, 
the fact that the court signed the findings and conclusions 
allows the assumption "that he found them satisfactory in all 
particulars." Rio Vista Oil, 786 P.2d at 1347. 
Defendant next argues that the findings and conclusions 
conflict with the court's "oral ruling" and with the evidence; 
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consequently, defendant maintains that the findings and 
conclusions are erroneous and the court's denial of the motion 
should be reversed. 
A. "Oral findings" 
Defendant argues that the court abdicated its judicial 
responsibility by failing to adequately articulate his ruling and 
then signing the findings and conclusions submitted by the 
prosecution. He then argues that the findings and conclusions 
conflict with the court's "oral findings" (Brief of Appellant 
[hereafter Br. of App.] at 12). The appellate courts have 
required trial courts to enter findings and conclusions in order 
to facilitate review. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 
(Utah App.) (factual "findings must be sufficiently detailed in 
order to allow us the opportunity to adequately review the 
decision below"), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (1990); State v. 
Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1300-1301 (Utah App. 1991) (adequate 
findings "ease the burden of appellate review by communicating 
the steps by which the ultimate legal conclusions are reached" 
and "enable appellate counsel to properly frame the issues on 
appeal" and comply with marshaling requirements). However, there 
is no requirement that the findings and conclusions be given 
orally in addition to in written form. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
("It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the 
close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
decision filed by the court"); State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 469 
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(Utah App. 1991) ("Rule 52(a) has been amended to • . . provide 
explicitly that the district judge may make the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law required in nonjury cases orally"). By 
adopting the proposed findings and conclusions, the court 
fulfilled its responsibility to enter them. 
Defendant's claim that the written findings and 
conclusions conflict with the court's "oral findings" also fails 
because the court did not enter oral findings. The court's 
questions and discussion at the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing should not be considered its findings of fact. After the 
evidence was in, the court asked why the detectives could not 
have administered the warnings before asking any questions, and 
saved "all the bother" of the suppression motion. The prosecutor 
responded by citing a United States Supreme court case 
(evidently, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638 
(1990)) for the proposition that certain preliminary questions 
are not covered by Miranda because they are not interrogation 
"designed to elicit a response" (R. at 160). The following 
colloquy occurred: 
THE COURT: The purpose here, though, was 
to see if they couldn't get a confession. 
That's what the purpose was, was it not, when 
they brought him into the booking office: 
name, address, place of employment, nearest 
relative. But there is one further point. 
MR. MORGAN: They did that, though, your 
honor. They had the Miranda [sic] ready. 
They were about to do that. They had not 
asked a single question. There is nothing 
that these people had done that is contrary— 
THE COURT: I'll read that case, but, 
frankly, I'm inclined to suppress the 
confession. It would have only taken them 
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about a second to read that when they brought 
him down to investigate; ask about the crime. 
That's the first thing they ought to do, 
because they've already got that information. 
Why do they need to ask that? All they 
need to do is look at the booking sheet. 
• • • 
THE COURT: Let me look at these cases. 
But that's where I'm coming from. 
THE COURT: I don't think this falls in 
the category of booking. There is a 
category— brought him down for the sole 
purpose of interrogating him about the crime. 
When they brought him there, the first thing 
they should have said is this is what we're 
here for. You read him Miranda, and then 
there would be no problem. 
THE COURT: As I say, based upon my 
knowledge at this time, and I can be 
corrected, but I'm inclined to suppress it, 
suppress the confession. 
(R. at 160-63). The court was merely discussing his perceptions 
of what he thought the officers should have done; however, he 
clearly had not reached any final conclusions about the motion. 
After he had read the cases provided by counsel, and the 
memorandum supplied by the State, he concluded that the 
statements would not be suppressed (R. at 184). 
Defendant argues that the court's statement that the 
detectives' purpose "was to see if they couldn't get a 
confession" was a finding of fact (R. at 160). There is no 
dispute that the detectives interviewed defendant hoping to 
obtain a statement; otherwise, why interview him? That is the 
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meaning behind the court's statement that the detectives were 
seeking a confession. However, as will be noted in Point II, 
that general purpose did not convert the detectives' initial 
background questions into "interrogation" in the Miranda sense. 
B. Evidence 
Defendant also contends that the findings signed by the 
court conflict with the evidence presented. He points again to 
the court's statement that the detectives were hoping to obtain a 
confession and claims that that conflicts with the finding that 
the detectives were "merely requesting biographical data to 
assure the interviewing detectives that they were about to 
question the right suspect" (R. at 87). The fact that the court 
accepted this finding demonstrates that defendant's reading of 
the court's statement about the detectives wanting a confession 
is out of context. That questions such as name, date of birth, 
etc., were asked to verify that the detectives were interviewing 
the right person does not conflict with the court's statement 
that the ultimate goal of the detectives was to obtain a 
confession. The preliminary, identifying questions were not 
intended to elicit a confession; as the findings state, they 
merely served to assure that the correct person was being 
interviewed. 
Although at the evidentiary hearing the detectives did 
not testify specifically that they were asking these questions 
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for identification purposes/ that is the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn from those questions being asked. The 
detectives had the booking sheet with the pertinent information 
before them; however, the detectives were not familiar with 
defendant and the questions had to be asked to ascertain whether 
the person before them was the person arrested and booked on this 
charge (R. at 146). 
Defendant next contends that the record does not 
support the finding that "defendant responded that he was 
presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, volunteered that 
during times when he was unemployed was when he got into trouble, 
that this is when he gets things into his head and does them, and 
admitted to the burglary" (R. at 85). Portions of that 
information did not come out as testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing, probably because defendant objected to the detectives 
testifying as to what his statements were (R. at 154). After the 
court ruled that the detective could relay the substance of 
defendant's statement, Detective Cheever gave a cursory synopsis 
of the statement (R. at 155). As defendant notes (Br. of App. at 
17), and the court stated (R. at 148), a portion of the 
preliminary hearing testimony was available to the court (R. at 
69-75; a copy is attached as Addendum D). The preliminary 
hearing transcript contains the portion of defendant's statement 
^Defendant called the detectives as adverse witnesses and 
conducted the examination by means of leading questions; the 
officers were never asked specifically their purpose in asking 
the preliminary identification questions. 
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which defendant now argues was not in the record. While the 
complained of portion was not testified to in the evidentiary 
hearing on the suppression motion, it was contained in the 
preliminary hearing transcript. Defendant did not object to the 
court having read that preliminary hearing transcript (R. at 
148), The full record demonstrates that there is no conflict 
between the finding and the evidence. 
Finally, defendant takes exception with the finding (or 
conclusion) that "[n]o coercion or deception of any kind was 
exercised by the Detectives [sic] in order to induce the 
defendant to speak with the police" (R. at 86). The evidence 
fully supports this determination by the court. The 
uncontroverted testimony of the detectives was that no physical 
force, deception, or intimidation was exercised against defendant 
(R. at 149-50, 157-58). Defemdant presented no evidence of 
coercion. He merely argues that an "incommunicado, unrecorded 
interrogation occurring in the small, old booking room at the 
jail, wherein two older and experienced Caucasian detectives 
questioned a young Native American" must have been coercive (Br. 
of App. at 17). While "custodial interrogation is inherently 
coercive," State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 n.6 (1990), 
cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992), the questions asked of 
defendant before administration of the Miranda warnings were not 
interrogation (see Point II). Defendant has failed to 
demonstrate that the court's determination that there was no 
coercion was erroneous. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS IS CORRECT UNDER THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 
Defendant asserts that suppression of his statements is 
mandated by federal constitutional law. The fifth amendment to 
the federal constitution states that no person "shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself[.]" "Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of an accused's 
in-custody statements was judged solely by whether they were 
'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause." 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1290 (1985) 
(citations omitted). "'Absent some officially coerced self-
accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even 
the most damning admissions.'" Id,, at 305, 105 S. Ct. at 1291 
(quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, 97 S. 
Ct. 1814, 1818 (1977). Whether a confession is "voluntary" is a 
legal question which is reviewed in the totality of the 
circumstances. State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah App. 
1991) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 
1246, 1252 (1991)). 
The so-called Miranda rights are "'not themselves 
rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures 
to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination 
[is] protected.'" Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305, 105 S. Ct. at 1291 
(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 
2364 (1974)). Whether a confession was obtained in violation of 
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the "prophylactic Miranda warnings" is separate from the issue of 
voluntariness under the fifth amendment. Elstad, 47 0 U.S. at 
305, 105 S. Ct. at 1291. Whether a person was interrogated for 
purposes of determining whether Miranda applies is a factual 
determination, reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Lavton City v. Araaon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991). 
A. Recording the statements 
Defendant first insists that the detectives were 
required to "record" defendant's statements5 and that failure to 
do so renders their testimony about the statements unreliable. 
Defendant does not argue that the recording had to be by audio or 
videotape. As in State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 1989), 
"there is no proof to support a determination that any 
significant item was omitted from the statement[ or] that 
defendant's rights were violated[.]" The means by which the 
detectives recorded James's statements is found in defendant's 
brief; defendant states that his statements were recorded in 
"Detective Newren's police report, which was not placed in 
evidence, but which was provided to defense counsel in discovery" 
(Br. of App. at 23). At least Detective Newren (and possibly 
5Defendant gave more than one statement to the officers; how 
many were given or the contents of any other than the first 
statement is not in the transcript of the evidentiary hearing. The 
detectives testified that defendant gave a spontaneous statement to 
the effect that "he did it, he went into a neighbor's house and 
took a coat and stereo" (R. at 155). The detectives then 
interrupted him and advised him under Miranda (R. at 156, 153). 
After he waived his Miranda rights, the detectives asked about the 
burglary and defendant made other statements (R. at 147, 70). The 
substance of the statements obtained after the Miranda waiver is 
contained in the preliminary hearing transcript (R. at 70). 
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also Detective Cheever) recorded the statements in the reports 
prepared of the investigation. 
The fact that the exact words recorded by Detective 
Newren were not presented verbatim to the trial court is not a 
function of the method or reliability of recording. Instead, it 
is a function of defendant's objection to introduction of the 
statement at all. When the prosecution asked Detective Cheever 
what defendant said, defense counsel objected to the court 
hearing the statement (R. at 154). The objection overruled, 
Detective Cheever testified that defendant said he was not 
working at that time, then defendant "went into the spontaneous 
statement." Again, defense counsel objected on the basis of 
"lack of relevance." The court said, "Let's hear what he has to 
say." Detective Cheever then gave a cursory summary of 
defendant's statement, not claiming that it was verbatim or taken 
from his record of the statement (R. at 155). Neither detective 
was asked to recite defendant's statement verbatim. 
Defendant's claim that the detectives did not "record" 
defendant's statements is factually incorrect; the statements 
were recorded by the detectives in their reports. The detectives 
were not asked to recite defendant's statements verbatim; in 
fact, defendant tried to preclude their recitation at all. The 
fact that a verbatim recitation was not given does not indicate 
that a verbatim record was not taken. 
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B. Defendant's first statement was not a response to 
"interrogation" in the Miranda sense 
Defendant states that the detectives "owed" him a 
Miranda warning at the outset of their interview (Br. of App. at 
25). There is no dispute that such warnings are required 
whenever a person is subjected to "custodial interrogation." 
Lavton City v. Araqon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Utah App. 1991). The 
State does not contest that defendant was in custody on the 
charge of which he subsequently pled guilty; however, denial of 
the suppression motion was correct because defendant's first 
statement was not a response to "interrogation" in the context of 
Miranda. 
Most cases since Miranda was decided in 1966 have dealt 
with the custody prong of "custodial interrogation." In Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1688 (1980), 
the Court addressed the issue of when an accused was interrogated 
in violation of Miranda. Not "all statements obtained by the 
police after a person has been taken into custody are to be 
considered the product of interrogation." .Id,, at 299, 100 S. Ct. 
at 1689. Instead, the Court concluded 
that the Miranda safeguards come into play 
whenever a person in custody is subjected to 
either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent. That is to say, the term 
"interrogation" under Miranda refers not only 
to express questioning, but also to any words 
or actions on the part of the police (other 
than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect. The latter 
portion of this definition focuses primarily 
upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather 
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than the intent of the police. . . . But, 
since the police surely cannot be held 
accountable for the unforeseeable results of 
their words or actions, the definition of 
interrogation can extend only to words or 
actions on the part of police officers that 
they should have known were reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response. 
Id. at 300-302, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90 (emphasis added; italics in 
original) (citations omitted). 
Innis was cited with approval in Lavton City v. Araqon, 
813 P.2d 1213 (Utah App. 1991), wherein this Court said: 
Cases since Innis have clarified that an 
express question from police to a suspect 
does not amount to interrogation if, under 
the circumstances, the question was not 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. Murphy v. Holland, 845 F.2d 83, 
85-86 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. 
Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th 
Cir.1985). The likelihood of incrimination 
must be determined from all of the 
circumstances; the same question may 
constitute interrogation in one situation but 
not in another. For example, in United 
States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462, 466-67, 
amended in 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.l986)[,] the 
court noted that asking for name, date of 
birth, and similar routine biographical data 
is ordinarily not an interrogation, but it 
was interrogation when asked immediately 
after showing a bank robbery suspect 
surveillance photos of the robbery and 
mentioning his accomplice by name. 
Araqon, 813 P.2d at 1215. 
Innis is the foundation for Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 
U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990), which the prosecution provided 
to the court at the evidentiary hearing (R. at 47-53). In that 
decision, four justices determined that there should be an 
exception to Miranda requirements for "routine booking questions" 
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"which exempt[] from Miranda's [sic] coverage questions to secure 
the '"'biographical data necessary to complete booking or 
pretrial services.'"'" Id. at 601, 110 S. Ct. at 2650 (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae). 
Four other justices found it unnecessary to determine whether the 
biographical questions fell within a "routine booking questions" 
exception because Muniz's responses were not testimonial. JEcL at 
608, 110 S. Ct. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Blackmun and 
Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). These 
justices appeared to accept the existence of a "routine booking 
questions" exception when they stated: 
Indeed, had the question [of when Muniz's 
sixth birthday occurred] related only to the 
date of his birth, it presumably would have 
come under the "booking exception to Miranda 
[sic] . . ., to which the Court refers 
elsewhere in its opinion. 
Id. at 607, 110 S. Ct. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Blackmun 
and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citation omitted). At least implicitly, eight of the justices 
accepted the concept of an exception to Miranda requirements for 
routine questions to obtain biographical data. 
Muniz is tangentially related to the present case 
because the detectives never claimed that they were booking 
defendant when they asked for his biographical data (R. at 146). 
Muniz is only relevant in that it reaffirms the analysis in Innis 
that questions do not amount to interrogation for Miranda 
purposes unless the questions are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. 
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The decision in Aragon is the most instructive in 
analyzing the present case. tf[A]n express question from police 
to a suspect does not amount to interrogation if, under the 
circumstances, the question was not reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response." Aragon, 813 P.2d at 1215 (citations 
omitted).6 In the circumstances of the present case, defendant 
was brought into the interview room and told that the detectives 
were there to investigate the burglary for which defendant was 
arrested (R. at 143). The detectives had not been involved in 
the arrest and, presumably, did not know defendant by sight (R. 
at 141). In order to ascertain whether the person who had been 
brought to the interview room was the same person booked the 
night before on this charge, the detectives began to ask 
biographical data (R. at 144). Since they had a copy of the 
defendant claims that Aragon and the cases cited therein 
confuse the "express questioning" with the "functional equivalent" 
of interrogation (Br. of App. at 26 n.8). Defendant does not 
analyze why an express question which is not reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response should be treated any differently 
than a functional equivalent of interrogation. As noted in Aragon, 
courts have recognized that Miranda interrogation requires some 
knowledge that a question, or its functional equivalent, must be 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement. Aragon, 
813 P.2d at 1215. In Innis, the Supreme Court said: 
The concern of the Court in Miranda was that 
the "interrogation environment" created by the 
interplay of interrogation and custody would 
"subjugate the individual to the will of his 
examiner" and thereby undermine the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination. 
Id. 446 U.S. at 299, 100 S. Ct. at 1688 (citation omitted). 
Questions which do not serve to undermine the privilege against 
self-incrimination do not raise a Miranda concern. See also Muniz, 
496 U.S. at 601-602, 110 S. Ct. at 2650 (plurality opinion) 
(questions which appear to be "reasonably related to the police's 
administrative concerns . . . fall outside the protections of 
Miranda"). 
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booking sheet with them, they could then compare the answers on 
the booking sheet with the answers then being given by defendant 
to verify his identity (R. at 146; Finding of Fact #4, R. at 85). 
When one of the detectives asked about employment, defendant said 
he was not working at the time, paused, then said that he got the 
idea in his head, went into a neighbor's house and took a coat 
and stereo (R. at 155-56). The detectives could not have 
reasonably known that a question about whether defendant was 
employed was likely to elicit an incriminating response. Since 
they could not reasonably have known that a question about 
employment would elicit an incriminating response, the question 
does not constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes. Innis, 
446 U.S. at 302, 100 S. Ct. at 1690. 
C. Post-Miranda statements. 
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285 
(1985), the Supreme Court held that "a suspect who has once 
responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby 
disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been 
given the requisite Miranda warnings." .Id. at 318, 105 S. Ct. at 
1298. This decision is based on the fact that the prophylactic 
warnings mandated by Miranda do not rise to the level of a 
constitutional mandate; thus, a violation of Miranda is not 
necessarily a violation of the fifth amendment. .Id. at 305, 105 
S. Ct. at 1291. Only if the statement sought to be introduced 
against defendant was obtained by compulsion must it be 
suppressed as a violation of the fifth amendment. .Id. The Utah 
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Supreme Court adopted the Elstad reasoning in State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 465-66 (Utah 1988). 
Even if the detectives had been required to advise 
defendant of the Miranda warnings before asking for biographical 
data, the failure to do so was corrected (barring actual 
coercion) by the subsequent advisement (R. at 156-57). After 
defendant blurted out a confession, the detectives interrupted 
him and gave him the warnings; he waived his right to remain 
silent and to have an attorney present (R. at 157). Apparently, 
he then gave additional incriminating statements (R. at 70). 
Elstad teaches that a failure to warn a suspect is cured by a 
subsequent warning; the statements given after the warning are 
admissible. "A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to 
a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement 
ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded 
admission of the earlier statement." JDd. at 314, 105 S. Ct. at 
1296. The fact that the statements obtained after a Miranda 
waiver are admissible makes admission of the earlier statement 
harmless, if error at all. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 466.7 
The fifth amendment aspect of Elstad requires analysis 
of the voluntariness of defendant's statements because a Miranda 
warning would not cure a fifth amendment violation. Ld. at 806-
807, 105 S. Ct. at 1292. A review of the record demonstrates 
that the interview of defendant "had none of the earmarks of 
7There is nothing in the record regarding whether the post-
Miranda statements contained items not found in the pre-Miranda 
statement. 
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coercion." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316, 105 S. Ct. at 1296. In 
Bishop, the supreme court illustrated some of those earmarks: 
The record discloses that defendant was 
not unlawfully detained by police and that 
the officers made no threats, promises, or 
inducements to obtain the confession. And 
although the officers' statements were direct 
and contained profanity, when viewed in light 
of defendant's age, education, and 
background, we are not in the least satisfied 
that [the confession was involuntary]. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 464. The court also noted that Bishop was 
not subjected to unduly long periods of questioning; the presence 
of a number of officers was not coercive; and Bishop's contention 
that he was particularly susceptible because he was tired was not 
supported by the record. Id.. See also State v. Heqelman, 717 
P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1986) ("Evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that a confession is unvoluntary must reveal some 
physical or psychological force or manipulation that is designed 
to induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have 
done so."). 
After the evidentiary hearing, the court determined 
that defendant "was subjected to neither coercion, physical or 
psychological, or induced to speak as a result of promises or 
deception of any kind" (R. at 86, Conclusion of Law #1). At the 
hearing, defendant presented no evidence to refute the 
detectives' testimony that they had offered no physical force, 
deception, intimidation, or promises to induce defendant's 
statements (R. at 149-50, 158). Defendant spoke English and 
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appeared to have all of his "faculties"; in addition, there were 
no indications of alcohol or drug use (R. at 158). 
Defendant asks this Court to presume involuntariness by 
assuming certain facts and certain emotions on the part of 
defendant which are not in the record. (Br. of App. at 34-35). 
The room in which the interview occurred is 12 feet by 13 feet, 
but there was no evidence that it was "isolated." (Br. of App. 
at 34; R. at 143). The fact that there were two detectives is "a 
factor to consider"; however, "the presence of more than one 
officer during" the interview was not sufficient to cause the 
statements to be involuntary. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 464. There 
was no evidence that defendant was "isolated from his family and 
friends, and from attorneys." (Br. of App. at 34). There was no 
evidence presented at the hearing about defendant's age, although 
from the booking sheet it appears he claimed to be nearly twenty 
(R. at 10). There was no evidence that defendant was 
"undoubtedly aware that, in the isolated circumstances of the 
interrogation, with no recording device in use, whatever was to 
happen in the old booking area of the jail with the two 
detectives would occur without witnesses." (Br. of App. at 34-
35). This melodramatic recitation has no basis in the record. 
The unrefuted testimony of the detectives was that defendant was 
cooperative and voluntarily answered their questions, 
spontaneously volunteering that he had committed the crime (R. at 
147, 149, 155-56). The evidence does not support an assumption 
that defendant feared the officers. There is also no evidence 
-29-
that the coercive factors delineated in Bishop existed in the 
present case. 
In summary, defendant's statements were voluntary under 
federal constitutional analysis and thus were admissible under 
the fifth amendment. There was no requirement to give Miranda 
warnings because the preliminary biographical questions asked of 
defendant were not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating 
responses. Defendant's volunteered statement that he committed 
the crime was admissible and the statements obtained after the 
warnings and waiver was admissible under Elstad even if the first 
statement were suppressed. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PRESENT GROUNDS FOR 
ADDRESSING HIS STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT; 
ADDITIONALLY, THIS CASE DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE 
A NEED FOR SEPARATE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant asks this Court to conduct a separate state 
constitutional analysis and suppress his statements. 
A. Waiver 
After the court denied suppression under the federal 
constitution, defendant filed a motion to suppress under the 
state constitution (R. at 92-101; a copy is attached as Addendum 
E). Although the motion is ten pages long and cites several 
cases, a careful reading demonstrates that the motion asks for a 
separate state constitutional analysis but fails to provide such 
analysis. The cases cited in the motion all indicate that the 
appellate courts of this state will conduct a separate state 
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constitutional analysis in the proper circumstances; defendant 
then asked the trial court to afford him "broader individual 
protections" under the state constitution (R. at 100). On 
appeal, defendant specifically asks that the Court require under 
the state constitution that all statements be recorded, 
presumably by audio or videotape, and that Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 
105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), be rejected (Br. of App. at 42-46). 
Defendant's motion to suppress under the state constitution 
neglected to specify what "broader" protections he was seeking 
and the reasons the federal protections were not adequate. 
Failure to provide "thoughtful and probing analysis of state 
constitutional interpretation" to the trial court, i.e., by 
specifying what additional protections the state constitution 
should afford and why federal analysis was inadequate, precludes 
considering this issue on appeal. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 
1272-73 (Utah App. 1990). See also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 
77-78 (Utah App. 1990), and authorities cited therein. 
B. The federal test for admissibility of a confession 
has been accepted as workable by Utah courts; 
consequently, no separate state constitutional 
analysis is needed 
As set forth above, this Court should not reach the 
merits of defendant's belated state constitutional argument for 
the suppression of his confession because he has failed to 
preserve the issue. However, if the Court does address the 
merits, defendant has failed to articulate any reason for finding 
a different protection under the state constitution. 
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Resort to state constitutional analysis is necessary 
only when changing federal law is confusing, contradictory to 
state appellate decisions, and erodes constitutional guarantees. 
These considerations were foremost in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460 (Utah 1990), wherein two justices of the Utah Supreme Court 
eschewed federal law regarding automobile searches in favor of an 
analysis under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
See id. at 465 (citing State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 
P.2d 136, 140-41 (1984)). The Larocco plurality was also seeking 
consistency. JId. at 466-69 (decrying federal search and seizure 
law as a contradictory "labyrinth"). See also State v. Vigil, 
815 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1991) (appellate courts have duty 
to provide "unambiguous direction"). Defendant has not presented 
any confusion, contradiction or erosion of constitutional 
guarantees compelling adoption of a different state analysis of 
self-incrimination law. 
C. Adoption of a different Miranda requirement under 
the state constitution is not necessary 
As this Court noted in State v. Erickson, 802 P.2d 111 
(Utah App. 1990): 
The Utah Supreme Court has not expressly 
ruled upon the question of whether Miranda 
warnings are required under the Utah 
Constitution. 
Id. at 113-14 n.2 (citing Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 141 
(Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting)). Defendant 
asks this Court to adopt the Miranda requirements under the state 
constitution and to extend them beyond the boundaries established 
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by federal rase 1 a w. Al t hou gh the e x a c t: e x t e n s I o i :t :i s i i o 1 c J e a :: , 
defendant apparently argues fnr t-wt) 'extensions: ] ) that Miranda 
warnings be required wheneve • :- person I s in custody, whether 
i n t e r r o g a t i o n o c c u r s o r n u t • -  Lruj u s e of a wo. ! an t;een»M il 
statemen t s\ : -hat- rriva' , defendant); and 2| that the 
warnings be required wheneve: -. person is questioned, whether in 
custody or not. (Br. c* ' n:q 
Miranda warnings from their ancho * . - * • e intersect!. * 
between custody ~ . lterrogati r established ! '-^lax 
case law - t 
compulsion ' v ,.~ .^  i- impacted by interrogatic • ntended ir 
elicM :rc:*.:.-!;o' r. - tatements. 
R e v i PW i iiiij LI M j h i h I M i ) (i J t i n . s* 1 i - i in i ~ a n s e s 
of the federal and state cons:i;utior.s, *ne Utah Supreme .^:,r 
concluded that the "cho.. - • o sed express::' * e 
pri v i lege oi > er art :: the. - ' oroaden the pr ; \:iege 
as it existed at [the * :n* • - • d • -: • . tution * — adopted]." 
American Fork City v. Crosgrc 
The fifth amendment says that no person can 
be compelled "to be a witness against 
himself," whereas article I, section 1 2 of 
the Utah Constitution says, "The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himsel£ " 
Id. (emphasis in original) T h e hi st CM i c H 1 tfK:kgnii..nd of 
adtjf nioiOFi ol I he state cc.tr ^ tut ion demonstrates that the state 
constitutional privilege was intended to have the same sc: ope as 
the federal privilege, "which was I he scope il had at OOIWIIUII 
]_d , a " See also Sandy City v. Larson, "733 P • 2d 1!7 , 
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138 (Utah 1987) (since the scope of article I, section 12 is no 
broader than its federal counterpart, although the case was 
decided under the state constitution, "cases decided by the 
United States Supreme Court and others offer guidance."); In the 
Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No. CS-1, 
754 P.2d 633, 645 (Utah 1988) ("To the extent that the common law 
defines the privilege, the federal and state provisions have been 
interpreted similarly."). 
Miranda warnings themselves are not required by the 
federal constitution. As the Supreme Court stated in Elstad; 
"The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore 
are 'not themselves rights protected by the 
Constitution but [are] instead measures to 
insure that the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination [is] protected.' . . . 
Requiring Miranda warnings before custodial 
interrogation provides 'practical 
reinforcement' for the Fifth Amendment 
right." 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305, 105 S. Ct. at 1291 (quoting New York v. 
Ouarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630 (1984), in turn 
quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 
2364 (1974)). If this Court chooses to adopt the requirement of 
Miranda warnings under the state constitution, it should not 
elevate those judicially created requirements to the level of 
constitutional requirements. The federal constitution does not 
require Miranda warnings; instead, the Supreme Court established 
the requirement in order to ensure that a person subjected to 
custodial interrogation who waives his privilege against self-
incrimination and right to counsel does so knowingly and 
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intelligent. 1 y , Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S 436 , 475
 J 86 S , Ct, 
1602, 1628 ( 1966) . 
hw Jy 111y ori Salt. Lake City v. Garner, b64 P , 2d I, 1.6\:\ 
(Utah 1983 defendant asks this Court require Miranda 
warnings whenever "the environmer* : the interrogation" is 
f - - • r * •. r • ... \; owed Mr. James a 
Miranda warning at the outset -: -.::< interrogate - under xK-
,.; x^randa- hp state const. * 
she;.,!'4 als adopt :.:;- federe c^se -.* tr,^ tx. * *• . *.a3 
developed 1 e parameter- ui ui- -• : liremer — ..i^, <3 
t-atp ^ 1 ederal self-incriminat * .n 
pre : = ions \a ;e the same scope, "although we decide this case 
under the Constitute 
States Supreme Court . - u L«?J guidance 
The experience * Oregon appellate courts 
demonstrate > . s anvr 
to adopt ,-. . federal Miranda J av Whei 1, the United States Supreme 
Court remanded Oregon v. Elstad fhp court of appeals of Oregon 
addressed - 1 lie Oregon cujibl .1 t.utJ on precluded 
use of his second confession even though the federal constitution 
did • State v. Elstad, P Or.App 3f ., 7]7 F ;M 1/4, ±/;>, 
rev, r .. .Mi i',/ii 'H'I *hp court stated 
thai . had declined previously "to adopt :; different standard 
under Oregon constitution for Miranda - si ateiiieiyiLs 
fi
 - " M l " lil " '•*-  • quoted: 
"Although we may interpret our own state 
constitution to provide greater protection to 
our citizens than United States Supreme court 
interpretations of the federal constitution 
provide, . . . steps to adopt a stricter 
standard should be taken cautiously and be 
supported by reasoned analysis and sound 
policy considerations." 
Id. (quoting State v. Mills, 76 Or.App. 301, 305, 710 P.2d 148 
(1985), review denied, 300 Or. 546, 715 P.2d 93 (1986); other 
citations omitted). The court did "not find, nor has defendant 
identified, principles, precedents or criteria that persuade[d 
them] to adopt a different rule." JTcl. at 176 (citations 
omitted). 
Shortly thereafter, the Oregon Supreme Court split on 
the issue of whether Miranda-type warnings were required under 
the state constitution. In State v. Smith, 301 Or. 681, 725 P.2d 
894 (1986), the defendant asked for a holding that the state 
constitution require Miranda warnings at a time earlier than 
required by federal case law. J^d.. at 903. Writing for a three-
judge plurality, Justice Campbell concluded that adoption of 
Miranda warnings under the state constitution was not warranted. 
He noted that there was no mention in the state constitution of 
any required warnings. JEd. at 904. He then gave the history of 
the warnings since Miranda, and noted the plethora of cases since 
1966 which have explicated the permutations of Miranda. The 
plurality opinion said: 
If we adopted a different Oregon Miranda rule 
or placed a different interpretation upon the 
present federal rule, then we have created 
confusion. We doubt that the "task of 
scrutinizing individual cases to try to 
-36-
determine, whether particular confessions 
were voluntary" would have created a greater 
case load for the courts than the flood of 
cases in the last 20 years that have tried to 
determine the correct application of the 
federal Miranda warnings, 
Oregon is in this situation: We have the 
federal Miranda warnings. By virtue of the 
Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment 
we have no choice. . . . We think that it is 
important to keep the Oregon law on 
confessions and admissions intact 
To adopt an Oregon Miranda rule identical 
to the federal rule without any commitment to 
future interpretations would be unwise. We 
would be in the same position as we are 
today, except that the ranch would have been 
sold with no down payment. To adopt an 
Oregon Miranda rule identical to the federal 
rule and tie it to future interpretation by 
the federal caselaw would be foolish. We do 
not know what may be waiting in the alley, 
To adopt an Oregon Miranda rule identical to 
the federal rule and place our own future 
interpretation on it would only further 
confuse an already confused area of the law. 
To adopt an Oregon Miranda rule different 
from the federal ru3 e is not warranted. 
Id. at 905-906 (footnote omitted), fi fourth justice concurred in 
the resul t bi it stated Una l hu> l>>] Ieveii the court hfid! a J, ready 
adopted Miranda-type warnings under the state constitution. Id , 
at 906-907, The remaining three justices,, i n dissent, 
refrained from stating that Article I, 
section 12, itself requires warnings before 
questioning. . . [T]here is no need for a 
court to freeze details into constitutional 
law when guidance can be found in laws like 
[Oregon statutes requiring Miranda-type 
warnings in specified circumstances] that < 
be further considered and refined by the 
ordinary lawmaking process. 
Id. at: 913-14. 
'": . Smith : ^ ed by the Oregon Supreme 
Court the next year .:;• State v. Kell, 303 Or. 89, 7;i4 P. 2d 334, 
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337 n.2 (1987). Kell did not involve a question of whether 
Miranda warnings should be given; instead, it asked what police 
may do when a suspect in custody only partially waives his right 
against self-incrimination. JId. at 336-37. The Oregon court 
said: 
[W]e must evaluate the issue of waiver in the 
light both of Oregon's sole responsibility 
for the meaning of the Oregon Constitution 
and of the benefits of adhering to rules 
which are widely followed outside Oregon and 
which we consider to be satisfactory. 
Although no authority outside Oregon can 
control our decision, there is no value in 
being different merely for the sake of the 
difference. That other courts generally 
follow a particular rule and that it appears 
to us to work satisfactorily are reasons in 
favor of following it in Oregon. . . . [In a 
prior case, the court refused to require 
under the state constitution more detailed 
warnings than Miranda warnings.] We did so 
because we did not believe that the 
alternative warnings were a sufficient 
improvement to justify a variation from the 
federal rule[.] . . . A majority of this 
court has not been able to agree whether 
Miranda-type warnings are required under the 
Oregon Constitution. 
Id. at 336-37 (footnote omitted). 
A few months later, noting the split in Smith and 
without direct citation to the state constitution, the court 
decided that the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes in 
State v. Macree, 304 Or. 261, 744 P.2d 250 (1987). The majority 
declared that it need not match the facts of this case to those 
in "the few cases decided by the United States Supreme Court." 
Id. at 253. Instead, the majority asserted that "Oregon law 
furnishes an independent basis of decision." The court then 
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c i t e d '-- :.-f : t : r-rii": ; a s r - : : - 1 . . r J Tje.ll ;'. ' ! ' . ' 
s p e c i f i c a l l y ?*.at^- rL;-~ r h e ^dependen t s t a t - r - ^ . - >a? " --e r a t e 
c , Magee 
formed the plurality in Smith concurred separately \z 
reiterate their opinion that ?v < ^ a * ~ **:••* *:u*\- i hut 
x* -r Miranda-type Maaee, 
An en banc .:e :?:- . ;:•;. the Oregon Court. . r Appeals In 
State v. Brow; Or.Apr . *,
 / 0J i- :e>.£*% e^i .t^, ou; 
C: rompoundec :-; .-„.-;. :. "• <=> 
lead opini in Brown assumed that the "independent basis" 
mentioned :• Magee w 
lead opir ;;.. :nen basics * \ adopted . federal standard that a 
pert ::\ must astody, :- equivalent, before Miranda 
concurred ;. ;.;^  result o,>. pointed *. the Magee case had 
not conclusively established that Miranda-type warnings were 
requited u; . tfrown, 
96. Pointing \* issent : .lowing in Brown, - > concurring 
judges stated, "If Newman, Riggs, correct that 
'compell in* i-ji "iei( j m i i i ij 
as torturou: » i : - under state law |d,y - found le 
judicial history - present federa. - - Finally,. 
two iui'.Jqefs dibfa 111 Brown i eibs» i| t.hd'1' Magee requi red 
"warnings when the police question isuspect circumstances 
that are 'compelling.'" ?/. The issm of custody hadl no 
bear j ng on the requirement. 16 
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This recitation of the route Oregon has taken points 
out the confusion that may follow if this Court decides in this 
case to pursue a state constitutional analysis. If the Court 
adopts the federal rule and ties it to future interpretation by 
federal courts, that interpretation may not conform to what the 
appellate courts of this State deem appropriate. If the Court 
adopts the federal rule and places its own future interpretation 
on it, the Court may find itself in a morass similar to the one 
in which Oregon finds itself. Adopting a standard which may only 
cause confusion serves no legitimate purpose. 
Defendant apparently asks this Court to require 
Miranda-type warnings from the outset of an interview between an 
accused and police officers. Adopting this position would 
preclude use of volunteered statements or statements in response 
to questions not intended to elicit an incriminating response, if 
these statements happened to come out before the warnings were 
given. Alternatively, defendant seems to be asking that warnings 
be required for any interrogation, whether the suspect is in 
custody or not. Adopting this position would unnecessarily 
hamstring law enforcement efforts. "Because Miranda warnings may 
inhibit persons from giving information, this court has 
determined that they need be administered only after the person 
is taken into 'custody' or his freedom has otherwise been 
significantly restrained." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S. Ct. 
at 1293 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S. Ct. at 1629). 
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De ienddJi I, li<!!;» [rilled tu
 (j r ! j i 'u 1 a to tiny legal 01 pel icy 
rationale behind adoption of either position- See State v. 
Elstad, 71 7 P 2d at: 175. He has failed Lo demonstrate how 
adopti on would broaden protection ten the conpt ;t.u: .:::a. . jr -
against compelled self -incriminati ' * facts * *• :e -ase io 
nou idisy < •. <••-' »n which cai mot --; adequat -,
 2 addresseu uy 
resort to federal Miranda analysis. 
D Recording the statements 
Defendant next conten :is t:ha t: i 11 Ider ar t i c] e I, sect:i c n 7 
of the Utal i Consti tution8 police ofticers should be required to 
"provide a reliable record ol the interrogations" (Br. of App, at 
4 2 ) . D e £ e i I d a i 11 d :: e s i I o t: nidi c a t e w h a t k I n d c f r e c o r c i r»f I h e 
interrogation we~ a - • .-je- .-.-. r wny . : v,. — .,.-* 
reliabl e , -•• ; -— - - •
 : Texas case, Shiflet v. State 
S , I- • . . . - • .. • ; d 
mandat- -_ \ . .: . .- .deotaped ;.*?... r. confession . ^ei (:he 
state constitution Texas - i about the admissib y 
oi OUT a J ccv • - i :. • -
Procedure; Shiflet was r ^  decided unde ~ consti . :,al 
provision. helpful. 
1 1 :i a s a d d r e s s e d I: h e I s s u e a n d adopted 
a requirement : audio videotaping of statements, where 
feasible, under their state constitution. Stephan v, State, 711 
P Alaska i However, I t di d so only 
8No person shall be dapi i ved n| 1. i,U»ll( I i her t ,' m [ipupeify, 
without due process of law 
because it had, five years before, informed state law enforcement 
officials that they must tape record, where feasible, any 
questioning of suspects. 3jd. at 1157. Nine other states have 
expressly declined to follow Alaska's lead. See State v. 
Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 809 P.2d 455 (1991); Gale v. State, 792 
P.2d 570 (Wyo. 1990); Jimenez v. State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d 
694 (1989); People v. Everette, 187 Ill.App.3d 1063, 135 111.Dec. 
472, 543 N.E.2d 1040 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 141 111.2d 
147, 152 111.Dec. 377, 565 N.E.2d 1295 (1990); State v. Gorton, 
149 Vt. 602, 548 A.2d 419 (1988); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 
201 (Miss.1988); Coleman v. State, 189 Ga.App. 366, 375 S.E.2d 
663 (1988); State v. Spuraeon, 63 Wash.App. 503, 820 P.2d 960 
(1991), rev, denied, 118 Wash.2d 1024, 827 P.2d 1393; People v. 
Raibon, P.2d , 1992 WL 119794 (Colo.App. June 4, 1992) 
(not yet released for publication). The Nevada Supreme Court 
stated that, "the concern is with the reliability of the 
testimony of the detectives, not with some unconstitutional 
action." The evidence of a failure to tape record the 
interrogation and the point that this failure called into 
question the reliability of the officers' testimony were argued 
to the jury. "The jury's determination that the detectives' 
testimony was truthful is sufficient to quiet concerns of 
reliability." Jimenez, 775 P.2d at 696-97. The Illinois 
appellate court stated: 
[T]he most appropriate means of augmenting 
the due process rights of citizens, 
especially in view of the ramifications of 
the rule urged by defendant, is through 
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legislation. . • • "In the absence of 
legislation, we do not believe it appropriate 
to require, by judicial fiat, that all 
statements taken of a person in custody" be 
recorded or transcribed. 
Everette 543 N.E.2d at 1047 (citing and quoting Vermont v. 
Gorton, 548 A.2d 419, 422 (Vt. 1988)). The Washington appellate 
court explained: 
[I]t is our view that such a sweeping 
change in long standing police practice 
should be made only after a full hearing of 
all the policy and financial implications and 
with adequate advance notice to a [sic] law 
enforcement in the form of the adoption of a 
rule of evidence or a statute mandating 
recording. 
Spurqeon, 820 P.2d at 963 (footnotes omitted). A requirement to 
tape or video record all interrogations should be addressed to a 
legislative or rulemaking body so that a full hearing on the 
implications of such a requirement could be held. This court 
should follow the lead of the majority of the states and decline 
to adopt such a requirement under the state constitution. 
E. The rule propounded in Elstad is appropriate 
under Utah law 
Finally, defendant asks this Court to presume that an 
unwarned confession taints any subsequent statements made after 
Miranda warnings. This "cat-out-of-the-bag" analysis was 
specifically rejected by the United State Supreme Court in 
Elstad.9 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311-13, 105 S. Ct. at 1294-96. 
defendant's quotation from United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 
532, 540-41, 67 S. Ct. 1394, 1398 (1947), is disingenuous because 
defendant left off the conclusion of the paragraph, which reads: 
But this Court has never gone so far as to 
hold that making a confession under 
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Defendant's claim that Elstad is inconsistent with or blurred the 
"bright line" of Miranda was also rejected by the Supreme Court. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317, 105 S. Ct. at 1297 ("The Court today in 
no way retreats from the bright-line rule of Miranda."). The 
holding of Elstad is based on, and consistent with, Miranda and 
its other progeny; defendant's bald assertion, without analysis, 
that this is "confusing precedent" (Br. of App. at 45) does not 
support a rejection of Elstad. 
Defendant also states that Elstad is inconsistent with 
prior state law; however, he has failed to support this argument. 
He cited to State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 184 and 
192 (1943) (plurality opinion), for the proposition that a 
confession "obtained by improper influences" may taint a 
subsequent statement (Br. of App. at 45-46). Elstad does not 
conflict with that proposition; a statement obtained by coercion, 
i.e., an improper influence, is inadmissible under the fifth 
amendment. Elstad allows admission of statements obtained after 
proper Miranda warnings, even though a prior statement was 
obtained in violation of Miranda. Elstad did not allow admission 
of subsequent statements if the original statements were obtained 
in violation of the fifth amendment. 
The other cases cited by defendant, State v. Ruqqeri, 
19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967), and In re Criminal 
circumstances which preclude its use, 
perpetually disables the confessor from making 
a usable one after those conditions have been 
removed. 
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Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), involve the rights of a 
person being targeted by a grand jury (Ruggeri), and a person 
being questioned under subpoena powers (Criminal Investigation^; 
neither of these cases is analogous to the present case. Whether 
a person should be warned that he is a target of a grand jury or 
warned of a right to an attorney and avoid self-incrimination, 
has no applicability to whether a person subjected to custodial 
interrogation can waive his right to remain silent after having 
given a prior, unwarned statement. 
Defendant has failed to establish any contradiction or 
confusion to justify providing separate state constitutional 
analysis in this case. Neither has he provided any legal or 
policy justification for imposing the additional requirements he 
seeks under the state constitution. Consequently, this Court 
should decline to establish different state constitutional 
requirements in the realm of confessions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <£*?— day of January, 
1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Elizabeth A. Bowman and Elizabeth Holbrook, SALT LAKE LEGAL 
DEFENDER ASSOC, Attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this j£*~ day of January, 
1993. 
/Vxtfi/Kf (flr-N-J 
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ADDENDUM A 
Th.ifC JUJrCi i 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
County Attorney 
B. KENT MORGAN, Bar No. 3945 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
MAY 2 4 1991 
SALT-^KLvJjJ?vj'V 
By -, 4'lr^cf^^-- -, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
EDWARD H. JAMES, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 911900562FS 
Before Hon. John A. Rokich 
A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before this 
Court on May 8, 1991, the State being represented by its counsel, 
B. Kent Morgan, Deputy County Attorney, and the defendant being 
present and represented by his counsel, Elizabeth A. Bowman, 
Esq., and the Court having taken testimony in the matter, having 
heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the authorities submitted 
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters 
its: 
U0084 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Page 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail on the evening of March 28, 1991 for the offense of 
Burglary, a Second Degree Felony in violation of §76-6-202 U.C.A. 
and Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor alleged to have been committed 
at 355 North 700 West, Salt Lake County, Utah on the same day as 
his arrest. 
2. From the time of his arrest until the interview conducted 
the following morning at 10:14 O'clock A. M., the defendant was 
not questioned by the police about any matter. At no time did 
the defendant invoke his right to remain silent or request 
counsel. 
3. On March 29, 1991, the defendant was called out from the 
general population into the booking area of the jail and 
confronted by Salt Lake City Police Detectives Gary Newren and 
Steve Cheever who immediately announced they were police officers 
whose purpose was to discuss the burglary committed the previous 
day. 
4. The detectives then asked the defendant general questions 
about his identity for the purpose of ascertaining whether the 
correct person was being interviewed. 
5. Detective Cheever questioned the defendant about his 
present employment to which the defendant responded that he was 
presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, volunteered that 
during times when he was unemployed was when he got into trouble, 
that this is when he gets things into his head and does them, and 
admitted to the burglary. 
UU085 
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6. Detectives Newren and Cheever interrupted the defendant 
and read him his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, to which 
the defendant responded that he understood each of those rights 
and agreed to speak to the Detectives about the burglary. The 
defendant thereupon gave a detailed confession about the 
burglary. 
7. No coercion or deception of any kind was exercised by the 
Detectives in order to induce the defendant to speak with the 
police. 
Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The mere fact that the defendant was in jail and called 
into the booking area does not render any statement made in 
response to police questioning involuntary under the totality of 
the circumstances, but rather is only a factor to be considered 
among the other circumstances of the interview. Based on the 
uncontradicted testimony of the Detectives who conducted the 
interview that the defendant freely volunteered the information 
requested and was subjected to neither coercion, physical or 
psychological, or induced to speak as a result of promises or 
deception of any kind, the Court concludes the defendants 
statements were voluntarily given under the totality of the 
circumstances. 
2. The police are not required to give Miranda admonitions 
to a defendant who is in custody prior to asking routine booking 
jinnee 
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questions which the police have no reason to know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response. The questions 
elicited prior to giving Miranda admonitions in this case were 
merely requesting biographical data to assure the interviewing 
detectives that they were about to question the right suspect. 
3. Notwithstanding any unwarned but nonetheless voluntary 
statement made prior to the Miranda warnings in this case, even 
if the unwarned statements resulted from interrogation within the 
meaning of Miranda, there is no constitutional requirement that 
this Court suppress the defendant's post-Miranda statements. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
Defendants Motion to Suppress is denied. 
£L DATED t h i s o(r day of May, 1991, 
/vy*v 
rObN A. ROKICH 
s t r i c t Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, #4276 
Attorney for Defndant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFEDERS ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LA! 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
• i L L , ' 
DiS^0'?' COUP' 
Hw?l tfoiPH'Si 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD JAMES, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTIONS OF FINDINGS OF 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 911900562FS 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
FACTS 
State's Fact No. 1 should have the following sentence 
added: The booking process on Mr. James was completed at that time, 
State's Fact No. 3 should read as follows: 
On March 29, 1991, the defendant was escorted by a jailer 
to the old booking area (now an interview area no longer used as 
booking) of the jail where two Salt Lake City Police Officers had 
requested he be brought. 
The two officers, Newren and Cheever announced they were 
police officers and that they wanted to interview the defendant on 
the burglary charge. They were not obtaining any information for 
the purpose of booking. 
Prior to interviewing Mr. James the officers did not 
UU081 
Mirandize Mr. James nor did they inform him of his right to silence. 
State's Fact No. 4 should read as follows: 
No testimony regarding the purpose of the interview other 
than the stated purpose of investigation of the burglary was 
Solicited at the Motion to Suppress. 
State's Fact No. 6 should include: 
6. After the statements were made by Mr. James the 
detectives read him his Miranda warnings. 
State's Fact No. 7 should read as follows: 
The defendant is a young Native American. Both officers 
were considerably older and white. The white officers were in a 
position of power compared to the inmate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The defendant was escorted by a guard, while he was in 
custody, to an interview area (the old booking area). Two white, 
experienced police officers introduced themselves and proceeded to 
interview Mr. James about the burglary without first Mirandizing 
him, Mr. James was never told he did not have to accede to the 
interview. Several questions into the interview and in response to 
questions from the second officer, Mr. James made statments about 
the offense. The officer then Mirandized Mr. James who made more 
statements. 
The State's reliance on the "booking questions" exception 
is misplaced for several reasons. Mr. James was booked the evening 
before. The booking process was complete. The old booking area is 
now used for interviews and that is where the interview took place. 
U0082 
The new booking area is in a different area of the jail. The 
booking procedure at the Salt Lake County Jail is done by Sheriff's 
Office employees. The two officers involved in questioning Mr. 
James were employed by the Salt Lake City Police Department. The 
stated purpose of the interview was to investigate the burglary. 
The Court cannot conclude the information was freely 
volunteered because that entails a knowing waiver of one's rights 
unless the information is not elicited by the officers. Here, the 
officer elicited the information by directing Mr.James be brought to 
them and by asking him questions. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Third District Court 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this day of May, 1991. DELIVERED BY 
'•nv* 11991 
PATAOAMQON 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
EDWARD H. JAMES, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM RE: 
ADMISSIBILITY OF 
POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS 
FOLLOWING UNWARNED 
STATEMENTS 
Case No. 911900562FS 
Before Hon. John A. Rokich 
ISSUE 
Defendant claims that impermissibly coercive methods were 
used by police to extract his confession, thereby making it 
involuntary. Defendant further contends that his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) were violated because the 
police delayed in advising him of his Miranda rights. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant is charged with the offenses of Burglary, a 
Second Degree Felony in violation of §76-6-202 U.C.A., and Theft, 
a Class A Misdemeanor in violation of §76-6-404 U.C.A. alleged to 
have been committed at 355 North 700 West i3, Salt Lake County, 
Utah on March 28, 1991. 
Defendant was arrested on March 28, 1991 and booked into the 
Salt Lake County Jail that evening. An Information was filed on 
April 1, 1991, and the defendant was informed of the formal 
charges and appointed counsel the following day by Third Circuit 
Court Judge Eleanor Van Sciver. A. a preliminary hearing 
conference held before Third Circuit Court Judge Jones on April 
9, 1991 failed to provide any resolution on the case. The 
preliminary hearing was held on April 16, 1991. After 
considering the evidence presented by the State, Judge Jones 
bound the defendant over as charged to enter a plea in this 
Court. 
The defendant pled not guilty to the charges on April 29, 
1991, obtained a reduction in bail and orally notified the Court 
the defendant intended to file a Motion to Suppress. Without 
disclosing the nature of the Motion, a hearing was scheduled for 
May 8, 1991. The written Motion was received by the State on May 
1, 1991 disclosing in general terms that statements were sought 
to be suppressed because of a violation of Miranda rights. 
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FACTS 
A hearing was held on March 8, 1991 wherein through the 
uncontradicted testimony of Salt Lake City Police Detectives Gary 
Newren and Detective Steve Cheever, the following facts 
surrounding the interview of the defendant on March 29, 1991 were 
adduced. Defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail on the evening of March 28, 1991. There is no 
evidence of any intervening events before the police questioned 
the defendant. Nor is there any indication that the defendant 
refused to speak with the police or requested the advice of 
counsel prior to the interview the following morning on March 29, 
1991 at 10:14 O'clock, A.M. 
It is uncontested that defendant was in custody at the time 
of the interview. He was called out from the general population 
of the jail and removed to the booking area of the jail. 
The interview began with a complete and honest disclosure by 
Detectives Newren and Cheever announcing they were police 
officers who were there to discuss the very burglary for which 
the defendant was being held in jail. 
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Following this disclosure, the defendant was asked general 
questions relating to his identity. The defendant was asked his 
name, his date of birth, his current living arrangements and 
about his employment. In regard to Detective Cheever asking the 
defendant about his employment, the defendant stated he was not 
working at the time, then paused, and added, "that this is when 
he got into trouble,11... wat such times, he gets things into his 
head and does them" and admitted to the burglary. 
At this point, defendant was interrupted by the police 
detectives and informed of his right to remain silent, his right 
to counsel and the right to appointment of counsel if he could 
not afford them pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. The defendant 
stated that he understood each of these rights, and agreed to 
talk to the detectives about the burglary. A detailed confession 
was thereupon obtained. 
Each of the Detectives stated that they believed the 
defendant's statements during the entire interview were given 
voluntarily, and that neither coercion nor improper inducements 
were used to prompt the defendant to speak with them. They 
further specifically testified that no use of physical force, 
intimidation or representations of deception were used to elicit 
any statement from the defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendants claims under "involuntariness" and Hthe denial 
of due process pursuant to Miranda" are two separate and distinct 
questions that require an entirely different analysis. With 
respect to the claim that his statements were involuntary, and 
therefore are inadmissible in contravention of his right to be 
free from compelled self-incrimination, both the Utah and United 
States Supreme Court have adopted the "totality of the 
circumstances standard". State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439, 463 
(Utah 1988); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
Factors to be considered in the determination of whether a 
confession is voluntarily given include assessing the degree to 
which the police may have used physical or psychological force 
designed to induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would 
not have done so. Clearly, the use of violence or threats of 
violence will render a confession involuntary. Pyschological 
coercion may exist where the police use improper influences or 
promises. Further, the defendant's age, education and background 
are relevant to determine his understanding of the questioning 
and his will to resist questionable police conduct. State v. 
Watts, 639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981). 
As applied to this case, defendant alleges only that he was 
in jail, called to an interview room and confronted by two police 
officers as factors to consider in rendering his statements 
involuntary. Under the totality of the circumstances, especially 
taken with the uncontroverted testimony of the interviewing 
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detectives, no shred of evidence of coercion has been introduced. 
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 464 (Utah 1988) (confession 
voluntary despite lengthy questioning and numerous police 
officers present during questioning)• 
A fair characterization of the evidence is that the 
detectives had to interject Miranda warnings in between the 
defendant's outburst of unburdening his guilt. To consider 
removal of the accused from the general jail population to an 
interview area as a per se involuntary environment would 
virtually preclude questioning of any individual after he had 
been booked. Clearly defendant's entire statement was voluntary 
under the totality of the circumstances. 
The next issue to be resolved is the legal effect of a delay 
in communicating to the defendant his rights under Miranda. The 
now famous Miranda admonitions arose from the United States 
Supreme Court's determination that interrogation in certain 
custodial circumstances may be inherently coercive. The 
requirement that the accused be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of 
an attorney, either retained or appointed was designed to even 
the scale between the police and the accused. "The prophylactic 
Miranda warnings therefore are not themselves rights protected by 
the Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected. New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). 
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The requirements of Miranda become relevant only when an 
individual is (1) in custody, and (2) subjected to interrogation, 
Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291 (1980). The State necessarily concedes a defendant in 
jail is in custody. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has recently 
affirmed the "routine booking question11 exception which exempts 
from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the biographical data 
necessary to complete booking or pretrial services. Pennsylvania 
v. Muniz, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 552 (1990). Prior to defendant's 
blurting out his misdeeds, all of the questions presented by the 
detectives can be appropriately characterized as routine booking 
questions designed merely to properly identify the person they 
were about to question about criminal activity. The 
determination of when interrogation has begun for the purpose of 
triggering Miranda has been defined as "words or action on the 
part of police that they should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innisf supra 
at page 301. The preliminary questions asked by the detectives 
do not rise to the level of interrogation within the meaning of 
Miranda in this case. 
Notwithstanding an argument of interrogation to the 
contrary, the law remains clear that only the statements prior to 
Miranda need be suppressed Both the Utah and United States 
Supreme Courts have held on cases factually on point that the 
Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require 
the suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda 
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warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police 
had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the 
suspect. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); State v. Bishop, 
supra. These cases reasoned: 
If errors are made by law enforcement officers in 
administering the prophylactic Miranda Procedures, they 
should not breed the same irremediable consequences as 
police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. It is an 
unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that simple failure 
to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual 
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the 
suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the 
investigatory process that subsequent voluntary and informed 
waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though 
Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be 
suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement 
should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is 
knowingly and voluntarily made. Elstad at page 309. 
Under the most gracious weight afforded to the evidence as 
viewed from the perspective of the defendant, only the unwarned 
statement could be supressed under the law. 
Defendant's reliance upon State v. Sampson is misplaced. 
That case turned on the issue of invoking the right to counsel 
after Miranda admonitions were given. No request for counsel, 
equivocal or otherwise was made in this case. Sampson has no 
persuasive value in the matter before this Court. Clearly, the 
defendants claim of a violation of Miranda is without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's claims of involuntariness and deprivation of his 
rights pursuant to Miranda are not supported by the evidence 
before this Court. For these reasons, it is respectfully 
requested that defendant's motion to suppress his statements be 
denied. 
'"it 
RESPECTFULLY submi t t ed t h i s V ^ d a y of May, 1 9 9 1 . 
DAVID YOCOM 
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MAILING/DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
MAI LED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this J^ dayrof May, 1991. 
ADDENDUM D 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
EDWARD H. JAMES 
CASE #911003552FS 
TESTIMONY OF OFFICER NEWREN 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
STATE: State your name and occupation for the record, please? 
A: Gary Newren, I'm employed with Salt Lake City Corp. as a police 
officer. 
Q: Are you presently in Detective division? 
A: Yes I am. 
Q: Are you acquainted with the Defendant? 
A: Yes, I am. 
Q: Do you know him as Edward James? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: Did you conduct an interview with him shortly after his arrest 
on March 28th 1991? 
A: I did. 
Q: What date was it actually, that you interviewed? 
A: I am not sure, I'd have to look at my note there to see the 
exact date. 
Q: Was it on or about March 28th? 
A: Yes it was. 
Q: Uh, and who was present during the course of the interview? 
A: Another police officer by the name of Steve Chever, myself, and 
Mr. James. 
Q: Was it recorded? 
UV0Q9 
A: No, it was not. 
Q: And, uh, prior to the interview did you advise the defendant of 
his rights pursuant to Miranda ? 
A: It was not, uh, immediately before hand, uh, there was some 
things that we were asking that did not need Miranda and then we 
asked Miranda ... when it became apparent. 
Q: .... and you're referring to identification information? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: How did he respond to your Miranda advise? 
A: He indicated to both questions, ya. 
Q: Allright, did you ask him about the burglary that occurred at 
355 North 700 West Apartment #3 on that day? 
A: We did 
Q: How did he respond? 
A: He responded that, uh, sometimes he gets things in his head and 
that he had done the burglary and gone through the window. 
Q: Did he indicate what he had taken? 
A: He did. 
Q: What did he say he had taken? 
A: He took the stereo and a leather jacket. 
Q: And did you assist Ms. Kilsnak in recovering that property? 
A: I did on the jacket and the stereo was already into evidence 
from the patrol officers that had, uh, placed Mr. James into custody. 
Q: Did you return the stereos .... 
A: Yes I did. 
- 2 -
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Q: And how about the leather jacket, where was that located? 
A: That was located at the Rothchild's pawn shop and that was also 
returned. 
Q: No further questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
It's Newren? 
It is. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Uh, you did transport Mr. James to jail? 
I did not. 
Detective Ch... did? 
No, the patrol officers did the night before. 
Oh, he had been booked the night before? 
That's correct. 
And you had him pulled out of the jail? 
Pardon? 
Did you have him pulled out of the jail? 
We never left the jail, the interview was conducted in the jail? 
Okay, was he, had he already been up on the floor in the jail? 
That is correct. 
So he'd been pulled down to, and then, 
Uh huh (affirmative). 
And that was at your request? 
Yes it was. 
- 3 -
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Q: Was he told why he was being pulled out? 
A: After we got there I explained to him why, what we were doing 
there, and our purpose. 
Q: And you indicated that you wanted to do a follow up 
investigation of the burglary? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: And you didn't operate .... before that? 
A: No I did not. 
Q: And after you indicated you wanted to do a follow up 
investigation of the burglary you proceeded to ask .... 
A: Clarifying his name and different things like that, because of 
the unusualness of the Edward and the James and date of birth, and, 
Q: Okay, but after indicating that you wanted a follow up on the 
burglary, you proceeded to question him. 
A: I believe I stated to him that myself and Officer Chever, 
Detective Chever were doing the follow up investigation of a 
burglary that occurred at 355 North on 700 West. 
Q: Uh, and then you proceeded to ask him some questions. 
A: That is correct. 
Q: Okay. And that would still before Miranda? 
A: That is also correct. 
Q: Now, some of the questions that you consider benign had to do 
with his name? 
A: Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q: His middle initial? 
- 4 -
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Yes. 
His date of birth? 
Yes. 
His birth place? 
Yes. 
His current living arrangements? 
Yes 
His job? 
Yes. 
His employment? 
Yes. 
And he remained cooperative throughout that? 
Very cooperative. 
And then Detective Chevers then asked him what he did for a 
living? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: And, uh, is it in response to that that there was an admission 
made, you believe? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And still no Miranda? 
A: Yes. 
Q: ....uh, at that point would makes the response he's still not 
been mirandized? 
A: That is "correct. 
Q: Now that the, uh, stereo, where did that come from, I'm sorry? 
- 5 -
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A: The patrol officers had placed that into evidence, uh, and it 
was located at the time that, uh, they had responded to the 
investigation of the burglary at that location at the request of May 
Kilsnik. 
Q: Was it, it's found at the scene? 
A: It was found in the apartment next to. 
Q: And this was in apartment that Cindy, was Cindy's home? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do we know Cindy's last name? 
A: Cindy Lee. 
STATE: Just Lee. 
Q: And her apartment was next to the, uh, Kilsacks? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Or her home? 
A: Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q: And that was, that would be immediately adjacent to it? 
A: Yes it is. 
Q: And who pawned the jacket? 
A: It would been a Mary Ann Jaussi. 
Q: Not Edward James? 
A: Yes, that's correct. 
Q: Was Mr. James told anything prior to the interview regarding if 
he would work with the officers things might go easier, anything to 
that effect? 
A: No. 
- 6 -
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Q: Did you, you indicated to him you were trying to solve the ...? 
A: I indicated to him that we were doing the follow up 
investigation on that burglary. 
Q: Did you explain what that meant? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Thank you nothing further. 
STATE RESTS 
ADVISING CLIENT 
BINDS OVER 
- 7 -
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ADDENDUM E 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, #4276 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER BOTH 
THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
Plaintiff, : CONSTITUTION 
vs. : 
EDWARD JAMES, : Case No. 911900562FS 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Defendant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 28, 1991, Mr. James, an eighteen year old Native 
American, was arrested for the offense of Burglary, a Second 
Degree Felony in violation of section 76-6-202, and Theft, in 
violation of section 76-6-404 a class A Misdemeanor. Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended). Mr. James was arrested and transported 
to the Salt Lake County jail where he was booked on the above 
charges. 
During the morning of March 29, 1991, at the request of two 
Salt Lake City Police Department detectives, Mr. James was 
escorted by a jailer to the old booking area of the jail. At one 
time this area of the jail served as the location for the booking 
process. Currently, however, this area is used by the Police for 
JUL 3 4 25 PM ^\ 
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the purpose of conducting interviews. 
When Mr. James arrived at this interview area the two 
Detectives, officers Newren and Cheevers both white males, 
announced they were Police Officers and stated they wanted to do 
a follow up investigation of the alleged burglary. Prior to this 
announcement Mr. James had not been told why he had been brought 
to this area of the jail. Before questioning Mr. James, the 
officers did not Mirandize him, nor did the officers advise him 
of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have 
counsel present. 
Detective Newren began the questioning by asking Mr. James 
to state his name, middle initial, date of birth and birth place. 
Detective Newren continued this line of questioning by asking Mr. 
James about his current living arrangement, his current job, and 
his employment. Mr. James remained cooperative throughout 
detective Newren•s questions. Then Detective Cheevers questioned 
Mr. James about his present employment. Mr. James responded that 
he was presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, stated that 
during times when he was unemployed he got into trouble. Mr. 
James then told the two Detectives that it was during these times 
of unemployment that he gets "things into his head" and does 
them. He then admitted to the burglary. 
At the time Mr. James made his admissions he had still not 
received any Miranda warnings, nor had Mr. James in any way been 
advised of his constitutional rights. Only after Mr. James 
admitted to committing the crime he was accused of did he receive 
2 
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the Miranda warnings which informed him of his constitutional 
rights. 
POINT I 
JAMES1S STATEMENT WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT 
AND TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT 
INTRODUCTION: The fifth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides in part that no person "shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. (emphasis added). Article I Section 12 of the 
Utah State Constitution provides that "the accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself". Ut. Const. Art. 1, 
sec. 12. (emphasis added). Mr. James asks this court to construe 
Article I, Section 12 as providing greater protection to the 
individual than it's federal counterpart. 
Mr. James recognizes the trial judge has ruled on the 
admissability of his statements under the federal constitution. 
See (Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress). However, he asks this Court to 
review and apply the federal standard, as well as the newly 
raised state standard, to the facts of his case to preserve all 
issues for appeal. 
FEDERAL STANDARD: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. 
Ct. 1602 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a person in 
custody must be informed of certain constitutional rights before 
3 
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being interrogated. Id. at 479. 
The Miranda Court and subsequent decisions defined 
"custody" as when an individual has been deprived by a law-
enforcement officer of his freedom of action in any significant 
way. Id. Interrogation is the "express questioning or it's 
functional equivalent." Id. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 
291, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980), the United States Supreme Court 
stated, "interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express 
questioning or it's functional equivalent, but also any words or 
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally 
attendant to arrest or custody) that the police should know are 
reasonable likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect." Id. at 300-02. 
In this case both parties agree that Mr. James was in 
custody and had not received any Miranda warnings when he made 
the admissions. Relying on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) 
this Court ruled, under the federal constitution, that the 
admissions were freely given and that the detective's questions 
were not likely to illicit an incriminating response. See 
(Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying 
Defendants's Motion to Suppress). However, Elstad specifically 
applies to officers correcting errors made in the initial 
prophylactic Miranda procedures. This case is not about officers 
committing errors in the procedure of giving Miranda, but rather 
is about officers who have chosen to omit the Miranda warnings 
altogether. For purposes of appeal Mr. James will cite two cases 
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in support of his contention that the trial judge incorrectly 
ruled under the federal constitution, and respectfully asks this 
Court to reconsider it's ruling. 
In Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) the 
Court held that an accused must be apprised of his Miranda rights 
if the setting is custodial or accusatorial rather than 
investigatory. Id. at 1170 (emphasis added). The court further 
stated it is "at the point the environment" becomes accusatory 
that a police officer questions must be prefaced with a Miranda 
warning. Id. 
The environment created by the two police officers who 
questioned Mr. James was accusatorial. The day prior to the 
questioning Mr. James was arrested and held on the burglary 
charge. Without any Miranda warnings the two officers began 
questioning Mr. James after requesting he be brought to them. 
The purpose of the questioning was to further investigate the 
burglary charge Mr. James was being held on. 
In Layton City v. Araqon, No. 900247-CA, slip op. at 4 (Ut. 
Ct. App. filed June 13, 1991) (copy attached), the Court 
carefully indicated in construing the Innis holding, "The 
likelihood of incrimination must be determined from all of the 
circumstances; the same question may constitute interrogation in 
one situation but not in another." Id. Furthermore the Court 
elaborated "the main focus is on whether the suspect is likely to 
incriminate himself in response [to a question]." Id. at 5. 
(emphasis in original). The focus is not whether the two 
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detectives believed their questions would lead to incriminating 
responds, but whether Mr. Jamies was likely to incriminate 
himself. 
Mr. James had been accused of the crime and was the sole 
focus of the criminal investigation. He had received no warnings 
safeguarding his constitutional rights prior to the police 
beginning the questioning. Cultural and age differences also 
increased the likelihood of Mr. James making an un-mirandized 
admission in an already inherently coercive atmosphere of a 
police custodial interrogation. Mr. James is an eighteen year 
Native American man who was subjected to his first adult booking 
charge and who was being questioned by two white, experienced 
police officers. 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: 
Based on an historical analysis as well as precedent from 
other cases, Mr. James asks this Court to suppress his statements 
under the state constitution should the Court choose not to do so 
under a review of the federal constitutional analysis. 
Historically, the right to refuse to give evidence against 
oneself was of critical importance to the drafters of Utah's 
constitution. The framers of the constitution were well aware 
and suspicious of governmental interference into the lives of 
Utahn's. Mormon settlers were persecuted by various regional 
governments. The Mormons had been continually persecuted for 
their religious beliefs since their inception as a religion. See 
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L. Arrington and D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience pg. 67-69 
(1980). 
With a history so replete with government sanctioned 
persecution and intimidation, the drafters of the Utah State 
Constitution sought protection from governmental interference. 
The original drafters intended Article I Section 12 to protect 
them more than the Federal Constitution did. 
The courts of Utah have at times interpreted the state 
constitution broader than the federal counterparts to insure 
greater protection for criminal defendants. For example, 
in In re Matter of Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No. 
CS-1., 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act which 
provided that upon application and approval of the District 
Court, for good cause shown, prosecuting attorneys could, among 
other things, subpoena witnesses and grant transactional 
immunity. 
In considering the constitutional self incrimination 
challenge to the Act the Court stated, "Article I, section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution is arguably narrower [than it's federal 
counterpart] because it states only that 'the accused1 has the 
privilege [against self incrimination]. Id. at 646. Rather than 
adopt a view that the privilege only attaches once charges have 
been brought, the Court embraced the common law approach that 
f,all witness must be able to claim the privilege if the purpose 
of the privilege is to be satisfied." Id. The Court reasoned 
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otherwise the state would be allowed to "poke about in the 
speculation of finding something chargeable." Id. citing 8 
Wigmore, Evidence sec. 2251, at 314 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
Under the rational of In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 
at 646, Mr. James could legitimately invoke the privilege under 
the state constitution once he became either a suspect or a 
witness. In addition, the Court also cautioned "the privilege is 
intended to protect against confessions secured by sheer force of 
psychological intimidation," (citations omitted) and compared the 
situation to the "psychological compulsion" inherent in a police 
custodial inquiry. Id. at 648. 
In State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1991) the 
Court set a stringent due process standard far more protective of 
individual rights under the State Constitution than it's federal 
counterpart. See also Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 156 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1991). Mr. James asks this Court to do the 
same. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the Supreme 
Court relied on Article I, section 14 in deciding that "an 
officer's opening a car door to examine a VIN on a door jamb" id. 
at 465, constituted an unreasonable search under the state 
constitution. The Court recognized that federal fourth 
amendment-law, especially in the context of automobile searches, 
"has been a source of much confusion among judges, lawyers and 
police." Id. at 466. Although the Court indicated that if it 
were deciding the case under the federal law, it "would hold that 
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a search was conducted within the meaning of the forth 
amendment, " it nevertheless reached its decision under the state 
constitution. 
The Court in In re Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 7th 
District Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) announced that 
the use of "accused" in Article I, sec. 12, applies as soon as 
someone becomes a witness to a case in the context of invoking 
the privilege of self incrimination. Certainly the same rational 
would apply to the use of "accused" with regards to the right to 
counsel which is also set forth in the language of Article I, 
sec. 12. Additional support for this reasoning can be found in 
the recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Sampson, 143 Utah 
Adv. Rep 12 (1990). In Sampson the court stated, "Moreover, as 
an arm of the State, the police have a responsibility to protect 
the constitutional rights of the citizenry, and erring on the 
side of giving the Miranda warnings before they are strictly 
required advances that function".... Id. at 20 n.12. 
CONCLUSION 
As indicated above, the language of the Utah constitution 
provides broader individual protections than its federal 
counterpart. It has also been established that the framers of the 
Utah constitution intended to afford the individual great 
protection against government incursion. Based on this unique 
constitutional development and the precedent cited above, we move 
this Court to find greater protection for criminal defendant's 
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right to silence and to right to counsel under Article I, section 
12 than the federal counterparts. We ask this Court to suppress 
any statements Mr. James made in violation of his state or 
federal constitutional rights. 
? fd DATED this ) day of July, 1991. 
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt LAke City, Utah 84111, 
this 
-^ _ 
day of July, 1991. 
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